CHAPTER 6: TERRITORIAL DETERMINISM: POLICE EXERCISES, TRAINING SPACES AND MANOEUVRES

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In 1983, a table-top game was developed in the UK. In 2003, a Specialist Training Centre (STC) opened. Each was designed to allow police officers to prepare, plan, and train for real-world public order incidents such as protests and riots, by enrolling them in ‘wargames’. Although there is a well-documented history of military and entertainment wargames, far less has been said on police wargames. In both the table top game and the STC, the act of playing acts as a disciplinary device scripting future, possible maneuvers – much like the mutable full-sized game maps discussed in chapter 8. From the 1960s onwards, I argue that there has been a ‘shift’ and a ‘switch’ in policing tactics, consistent with a (para-) militarization of protest policing within the UK over the last 30 years, affecting the nature of such manoeuvres.

Up until the last 15 years or so, the main objective in the deployment of such (para)military tactics has been to disperse protesters. The original identification of this shift marked the start of an intense, public debate on the changing role of the police in public order situations. Northam argued in Shooting in the Dark that these decisions were rooted in a strategic, organizational and tactical cross-fertilization between colonial police officers, forces and protocol and mainland British equivalents. ‘Short-shield tactics’, ‘batons rounds’ and ‘snatch squads’ – three of these new strategic, organizational and tactical protocols – originated in British colonial outposts in Hong Kong and Northern Ireland. Decades later, these public order policing experiments – executed in colonial spaces – were reimported back onto mainland Britain as a solution to urban riots.

5 Northam, Shooting in the Dark.
The table-top game developed in the UK in 1983 was designed to act as a ‘model environment’ in which new, public order policing strategies could be tested. The game itself was based around a fictional town known as ‘Sandford’, and developed in response to the Brixton riots (1981). In 1985 it assumed real-life relevance, as a template for the police response to the Broadwater Farm riots in north London. Despite the spatial similarity between Sandford’s ‘Carruthers Estate’ and Broadwater Farm, the latter posed challenges of a vertical nature to the police operation, akin to in-game vertical challenges mentioned later in chapter 7. The various pedestrian walkways comprising the estate, meant police officers were forced to direct their attention in multiple directions. Whilst the Sandford game prepared them for a particular set of possible encounters with protesters, Broadwater presented unanticipated ones. In the words of Coleman, it became an ‘indefensible space’.

Conversely, the STC is, as I also argue, designed to prevent particular kinds of mobile public order situations more prevalent since 2003. In the years since, the police ‘containment’ or ‘kettle’ manoeuvre has been liberally deployed during protest events in order to corral and contain protesters to prevent disruption. The spatial layout, building density and architectural style of the STC thus narrows the range of possible territorial responses to emergent threats manifested during demonstrations or riots. Sandford thus acts as ‘simulator’ of public order situations, whereas the STC performs as an ‘emulator’ of urban spaces in which public order situations are played out. Despite this categorical difference, both assist in the ‘anticipation’ of future actions during public order incidents. Namely, they operate to aid police officers in predicting, and responding to, possible activist ‘manoeuvres’ executed to ensure ongoing disruption to quotidian life during moments of civil disobedience.

In both cases, as I conclude, this leads to a ‘territorial determinism’ in which ‘live’ public order policing reproduces the training scenarios as practiced in advance of such events. In this sense, the training space de-limits the range of operational possibilities that can be anticipated, presenting issues for how police officers deal with public order situations. This has implications for both the police and protesters.

Wargaming and Exercises

Wargaming has a long history beginning with Carl von Clausewitz’ *On War*. As Crogan notes, its emergence in the 1800s is concomitant with the rise of modern forms of warfare that demanded innovative techniques for modelling military outcomes:

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10 Crogan, ‘Wargaming and Computer Games’.
Adopted as a method of training for military officers, wargaming contributes a new technique to the equipment available to improve the conduct of war, that most unpredictable and potentially lethal future possibility.\textsuperscript{11}

What drives the deployment of the wargame is, as Crogan\textsuperscript{12} further suggests: ‘the potential to offer a rational basis for predicting and therefore controlling the future’. Specifically, as he also mentions, such developments were not tactical innovations as to the performance of warfare itself but strategic and logistical ones designed to aid the overall oversight of, and deployment of troops within, particular military engagements. As such, the wargame was originally – and continues to be – orientated towards a mapping of possible events. The playing of the wargame, therefore, becomes the mode through which this future can be articulated.

But whilst wargaming has a longer history stretching back to Clausewitz\textsuperscript{13}, it has had a more contemporary resurgence in the form of civil emergency planning. As Adey and Anderson\textsuperscript{14} contextualizes:

Emergency planning is a modality of future-orientated security that sits within much broader and diverse nested approaches towards the anticipation and governance of events that have their origin in World War II, the emergence of civil defence and air-raid precautions, and the subsequent Cold War context of thermonuclear threat and industrial instability.

In 2004, the \textit{Civil Contingencies Act} came into force in the UK, updating a variety of previous Acts of Parliament deemed insufficient to legislate for modern responses to terrorist attacks and floods. Although categorically different to public order incidents, these ‘civil emergencies’ share the same strategic training significance as the former; with techniques and protocols developed for responses to outbreaks of civil disobedience also applicable to civil emergencies. Indeed, much public order policing has adopted the formats for training and preparation as laid down in response to the \textit{Civil Contingencies Act}.

For example, the Central Government Emergency Response Training (CGERT) course, ‘designed to equip people with the knowledge, skills and awareness necessary for their role in crisis management at the national strategic level’, was devised to ensure ‘all organizations are fully prepared for all types of emergencies’.\textsuperscript{15} The CGERT course identifies three types of exercises: discussion-based, table top and live. The first of these is the ‘cheapest to run and easiest to prepare’.\textsuperscript{16} Most often, ‘they are based on a completed plan [on how to respond to a civil emergency] and are used to develop awareness about the plan through

\textsuperscript{11} Crogan, ‘Wargaming and Computer Games’, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{12} Crogan, ‘Wargaming and Computer Games’, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{13} Clausewitz, \textit{On War}.
\textsuperscript{16} Cabinet Office, ‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness’.
Ordinarily, then, discussion-based exercises are not designed as simulation tools or emulation spaces. Instead, they allow participants to become aware of extant civil emergency preparedness plans.

Table top exercises, on the other hand, ‘are based on simulation’ and ‘involve a realistic scenario and a time line, which may be real time or may speed time up’.

As the Cabinet Office continue:

> Usually table tops are run in a single room, or in a series of linked rooms which simulate the divisions between responders who need to communicate and be co-ordinated. The players are expected to know the plan and they are invited to test how the plan works as the scenario unfolds.

This is how the Sandford exercise was designed. Although often ‘not…literally around a table top’, the Sandford version was indeed ‘spread out on a table-top’ with the game equipment, control kit and computer all based in the same or an adjoining space. What marks a table top exercise apart from a discussion-based exercise is that whilst the latter is merely a tool for communication, awareness and discussion; the former allows participants to engage practically with possible event scenarios. As the Cabinet Office suggest, ‘[t]his type of exercise is…useful for validation purposes, particularly for exploring weaknesses in procedures’. In other words, to allow participants to test envisaged, desired, and ‘idealized’ responses to civil emergencies.

Live exercises are a ‘live rehearsal for implementing a plan’. ‘Such exercises are particularly useful for testing logistics, communications, and physical capabilities’. Whereas table top versions test idealized responses, live exercises allow responders to put into practice these idealized civil emergency plans. Whilst table top exercises usually only involve a small number of officials – usually senior, strategic personnel – live exercises ordinarily use a combination of actual staff (officers, paramedics, doctors, etc.) and volunteers (victims, passengers, etc.).

The difference I make here, however, is not strictly between table top and live exercises. Instead, it is between a table top *game* or *map*, and a live exercise *space*. The reason for this is to enable a distinction between a simulation and an emulation. The Sandford table top game and map enable an execution of ‘higher-level’ activities, whilst the STC enables the performance of ‘on-the-ground’ activities. Nevertheless, both (ideally) serve as anticipatory devices designed to stimulate particular kinds of territorial responses by police officers.

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17 Cabinet Office, ‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness’.
18 Cabinet Office, ‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness’.
19 Cabinet Office, ‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness’.
20 Cabinet Office, ‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness’.
21 Northam, Shooting in the Dark, p. 3.
22 Cabinet Office, ‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness’.
23 Cabinet Office, ‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness’.
24 Cabinet Office, ‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness’.
Further, whilst I have used the CGERT literature to provide definitions of these various training exercises, there are still some notable differences between the governing of civil emergencies and public order situations. Firstly, CGERT ensures practitioners are equipped to deal with specific types of emergencies. As Anderson\textsuperscript{25} suggests; ‘UK preparedness emerged after a series of disruptive events, including Y2K, the fuel crisis and foot-and-mouth disease’. Whilst public order situations can also be defined as ‘disruptive events’ they ordinarily occur at a ‘sub-sovereign’ level. Secondly, CGERT is designed to enable the coordination of multiple organizations, with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 introduced to enable a facilitation of eight key principles: anticipation, preparedness, subsidiarity, direction, information, integration, cooperation, and continuity.\textsuperscript{26} In essence, to enable appropriate, efficient and effective response to otherwise complex, sovereign events. Conversely, public order situations are treated, in the first instance, only by the police. Both of these differences matter for how the exercises are practiced, and what strategic, tactical and logistical decisions are made.

These distinctions are necessary in order establish the purpose of both the Sandford wargame, and the STC. Manoeuvres performed in each are not carried out at a sovereign level, nor do they occur with the cooperation of various organizations. As such, it is necessary to both limit discussion to evolving police strategy, tactics and organization, and to focus attention on a period of time pre-dating the Civil Contingencies Act. This is despite of the obvious import of preparedness protocol into contemporary public order policing strategies.

**Shooting in the Dark**

The fictional Carruthers Estate only exists on a table top game developed in order to train police officers in public order scenarios. It is, in essence, a wargame in which police officers must respond to, as well as anticipate various incidents as they occur. As Northam\textsuperscript{27} explains:

The backstreets of the Carruthers Estate are known to policemen from all over Britain. Uniformed officers have trained in their thousands in the escalating violence of Sandford on a Saturday night. To a senior officer – Chief Inspector upwards – the names of the four entrances to the Carruthers Estate are as familiar as the Old Kent Road and Park Lane (from a different board game). They are: Polygon Close where the public house is set on fire [in this scenario], Wren Close, Robin Close and Snow Close where the shooting starts.

The town of Sandford itself became a model space through which specific riot scenarios could be played out, and senior officers could be trained in how to respond to their ever-evolving nature. Common parts to this riot scenario included football-related violence, pub estate-based arson, and firearms incidents. Materially, the game consisted of, as Northam details:

\textsuperscript{27} Northam, Shooting in the Dark, 2.
...a large map of Sandford to be spread out on a table-top; a box full of wooden police vans and little wooden crowds with numbers of rioters printed on them (from 15 up to 600); another box of coloured wooden counters with codes on them indicating units of the Sandfordshire Constabulary a handful of senior officers, also made of wood and labelled CH INSPI or SUPT [Chief Inspector or Superintendent]; and a control kit listing all the possible complications to the basic story which the computer could generate in response to hasty decisions by the commanders under training. They also had four wooden dogs, each labelled DOG.28

In order to make it as realistic as possible, as Northam suggests, the permutations in each scenario were generated by a computer. ‘The Facilitator’29 was the official title of the senior officer in charge of the game itself, and responsible for both relaying time-specific computer-generated information to the playing officers, as well as adding additional strategic details into the scenario mix too. Examples of these include: previous disorders in the fictional town, recent events (football games etc.), information on housing stock and the social make-up of Carruthers Estate residents. Northam also notes another material objects in the game: the so-called ‘deployment board’ which allows senior officers playing the game to ‘show at a glance which police units are on stand-by around Sandford throughout the trouble to come’.30 Unlike the wooden table top map, the deployment board is magnetic. This assemblage of computer-aided event generator, wooden table top map, magnetic deployment board and human facilitator and player make-up the public order wargame as devised and deployed around the UK in the early 1980s.

As Northam again details:

The whole of Sandford was created in 1983 by a small committee of senior officers from different police forces who devised a training programme for every part of the country to prepare for real-life rioting of the kind which broke out in London, Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol and elsewhere in 1980-81. Their job was to ensure that riot police from each force are trained in exactly the same way, so that men form anywhere can be sent as reinforcements to disturbances anywhere else. At that stage, in 1982, none of those involved talked about taking on pickets in any industrial dispute or fighting a convoy of hippies. It was riots that worries them, and Sandford could stand for any of the tense real-life inner-city areas where they might break out.31

Up until this point (1983) it was argued that police forces were ill-equipped to respond to public order situations. In 1981 when various urban riots began, there was no national training program in public order policing, and as such, no established, universal approach to policing public protests, demonstrations or riots across the UK. As Northam

29 Cabinet Office, ‘Emergency Response and Recovery, p. 3.
suggests above, at this stage there was no consideration that the scenarios played out in the fictional town of Sandford would be played out under different circumstances altogether.

The Broadwater Farm Estate in Tottenham, north London bore a striking similarity – in design and in social make-up – to the fictional Carruthers Estate. Yet as Northam suggests, this ‘marked resemblance’ between the two is emblematic of the supposed geographical terrain senior police officers expected public order incidents to occur across at the time: the urban council estate.

Like many social housing developments built in the 1960s, the Broadwater Farm Estate was a Le Corbusierian experimentation in high-density, high-rise living. The concept of ‘streets in the sky’ – as opposed to low-rise or terraced housing – had radically altered urban life for residents. They were intended as all-encompassing estates comprising of every amenity necessary for residents, as well as a general mix of tenants. Yet the familiar story is that many of these high-rise, ‘deck-access’ developments – Park Hill, Sheffield; Balfron Tower and Robin Hood Gardens, East London; the Southgate Estate in Runcorn New Town; Hulme Crescents, Manchester – quickly deteriorated. A general mix of poor quality building materials, ill-functioning service facilities such as mechanical lifts and refuge chutes, and the increasing presence of drug dealers and criminals who, supposedly, used the various interconnected networks of above-ground streets to evade the police, conspired to make them undesirable, generally uninhabitable and ‘indefensible’.

Figure 6.1 Estate Maps. Broadwater Farm (left) and Sandford (right) maps.

33 Coleman, Utopia on Trial.
The reasons for their perceived failure are complex, not least because many, such as Hulme Crescents (1972-1994) in Manchester, were built as cities in general were suffering endemic decline across the UK and Europe. It is perhaps of no coincidence that ‘the Crescents’ were effectively abandoned by Manchester City Council in 1984: the same year as the Sandford wargame training began. The estate’s reported failures, not only in Hulme but across the UK, centred on build quality and integrity. In reality, they became not simply indicative of wider socio-political problems – poverty, inequality, diminishing race relations – but actual battlegrounds over which these issues were fought, defensive strategies formulated, and for which the Sandford wargame was designed to simulate.

The feature of these estates – high-rise and above-ground – made interactions between police, residents and young people remarkably different in form to those in previous eras. It meant that the police were forced to abandon their vehicles and patrol by foot. As Northam describes, the layout of the fictional Carruthers Estate lends itself only to the latter form of movement:

‘Let me just tell you something more about the Carruthers Estate,’ says the Facilitator. ‘You have some fears about it from the information you got from Father Brown [a reliable community mediator] and the local councillor. That centre quadrangle there is about the size of a football pitch, and tends to be a pedestrian-type area with trees, waste-paper bins, benches, etc. There are one or two shops but no more than that in the centre quadrangle. It is not a shopping precinct. Snow House, where you have got one of your observation posts, is a fourteen-storey block of flats, as is Robin House across the other side. Polygon House, Owl House, Wren House are again high-rise of six or eight storeys...’

Although the Carruthers Estate is never explicitly referred to as a typically ‘streets in the sky’ arrangement, it is clear from the description that it shares similarities. There is a central ‘pedestrian-type area’ that serves as a community meeting point common to high-rise, multi-level developments such as the Brownfield Estate in East London, the Golden Lane Estate in the City of London, or the aforementioned Hulme Crescents. Although the surface differed for such – sometimes concrete flagstone, other times grass – they served the same purpose, and generally included local convenience-style shops (off-licenses, general food stores, and pharmacies), playgrounds, and educational/medical facilities, although the Crescents incidentally lacked the latter.

Also noted in the description above are the varying ‘houses’ of different heights; some with fourteen-storeys (Snow and Robin House) and others with ‘six or eight storeys’ (Polygon, Owl and Wren House). Indeed, as a design concept ‘streets in the sky’ was deployed in a decidedly loose fashion by architects and planners, broadly in homage to the ideas executed by Le Corbusier during the 1950s, especially in his famous Unité d’habitation developments in Marseille, Nantes-Rezé and Berlin. Some were single-unit blocks containing all possible amenities (such as the Unité d’habitation), others were multi-unit developments with

34 Northam, Shooting in the Dark, pp. 6-7.
local amenities close-by, or incorporated into the wider estate. Perhaps the more accurate depiction of these various developments is their commitment to separating vehicular and pedestrian traffic. This resulted in various multi-level designs in which vehicles would be allowed to use ground-level access roads and pedestrians would traverse elevated walkways, escaping the pollution at ground-level and reducing the interface between vehicles and people. As the facilitator continues:

The four entrances into the estate are Wren, Robin, Polygon and Snow Close. They have **concrete pillars cemented into the ground to prevent vehicle access**, with the exception of one which has collapsible metal barriers to allow fire brigade or other emergency vehicles into it. High-rise and low-rise, generally low-class type dwelling, and generally speaking, a place where the local police officer is received, but not a place where he is well received.35

The pedestrianization of urban estates and city centres themselves is a common feature of many UK cities. Estates, as microcosms of urban life, became playgrounds in their entirety, partly due to this human-scaled (rather than vehicular-orientated) environment. The pedestrianization of public space, and the hosting of events (carnivals, festivals, firework displays, New Year celebrations, religious occasions, sporting celebrations etc.) within such, or the re-designation of non-pedestrianized roads for the **purposes** of pedestrian-centered events is a hallmark of contemporary urban planning and governance that has roots in urban estate design from the 1950s onwards.

That a strategic wargame or table top exercise was devised in order to train and prepare officers in the policing of these new environments – in both ‘everyday’ circumstances and ‘riot’ situations – is indicative of the radical threats perceived by urban police forces during the 1980s. Sandford is the first known table top exercise to be deployed in training for UK police officers. The critical component of its design – despite being identical to Clausewitzian wargames in formal, mechanical terms – is that it allowed players (senior officers) to anticipate future possible incidents such as the throwing of projectiles, the damage of property, or the injury to officers.

**Specialist Training Centre**

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) STC in Gravesend, Kent is a contemporary space in which actual manoeuvres, rather than strategic decisions, are practiced. In a tabloid news article on the centre photographer James Rawlings is quoted as saying that ‘[i]t was fascinating to observe people ‘playing war’ in the same way we might play a computer game, but much more physically true to life’.36 In other words, the training centre provides

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35 Northam, Shooting in the Dark, p. 7.
the opportunity for officers to learn various manoeuvres they would otherwise be unable to learn in a simulated environment or through discussion-based, or table top exercises.

Spatially, the STC is laid out just like a modern, British town. Plans of the site, visible on OpenStreetMap (OSM), show it as a compact location comprised of a number of generic, yet instantly recognisable urban features. These include a typical and aptly named ‘High Street’, other parallel and intersecting roads (‘Oliver Way’, ‘Vickers Way’, ‘Farrance Street’), an open green space, and a railway station. Its layout is markedly different from the fictional Carruthers Estate in Sandford. There is no central, ‘quadrangle’ lined with shops. Instead, there is a dense network of vehicular routes either designed for one- or two-way travel. In James Rawlings’ photo series Control (2014) other features such as junction railings, post-boxes, pelican crossings, grass verges lined with young trees can be seen. A fictional pub (’The Roebuck’) and a takeaway (’Pizzaland’) are also visible. The majority of building types are double-story terraced houses or split retail-flat arrangements. Sightlines are limited to the length of these streets, offering ‘differential visibility’ (such as the in-game maps noted in chapter 7) and there is a limited verticality within the landscape (i.e. no elevated walkways).

By comparison, the Carruthers Estate contains a number of high-rise apartments blocks, as mentioned previously, each flanked by access roads (or, ‘closes’) into the quadrangle. Four pubs (The Vines, Orient Inn, Black Horse and Alderney Arms) are located on the fringes of the estate and in the wider town itself. The difference in spatial layout between the STC and the Carruthers Estate are marked. As such, the manoeuvres practiced in each are performed in, and respond to, vastly different environments.

Figure 6.2 Control. By James Rawlings (2014).
In a Channel 4 documentary, *Ready for a Riot* (2009), as Sgt. Adam Nash of the MPS notes, ‘you can’t recreate incidents on the street but this is as close as we can get to doing it, so when we are called upon to respond to any public order incidents, they’ve [police officers] got as much training and time that we can give them’.

What is different between the Sandford wargame and the Gravesend emulation space is that the former was designed as a strategic aid to teach commanding officers appropriate meta-techniques to ensure proper officer deployment, concentration and approach. In other words, to define the context within which manoeuvres would be deployed; not to teach the manoeuvres themselves.

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**Dispersal to Containment**

Since the development of the Sandford wargame in 1984, public order policing training has advanced. However, up until 1983 three tactical manoeuvres deployed against the Northern Irish and Hong Kong populations, now in the wider repertoire, had never been used on the mainland before. These were: non-lethal ‘baton rounds’, short-shield units and arrest or so-called ‘snatch squads’. Each of these are tactics are designed to do two things. Firstly, to

disperse the gathered crowd. As such they are tools for direct territorial control in the entirely geographical, militaristic sense. Secondly, each is designed to strike fear into the crowd. As such they are psychological tools intended to give the police an upper hand in controlling those involved in the unrest, separating and splitting the crowd into unwilling factions.

Although non-lethal baton rounds or plastic bullets have only ever been authorized for use once on UK soil, (during the Broadwater Farm riots) they have never been fired. However, throughout the 1980s the deployment of short-shield units and snatch squads became commonplace. As John Alderson, previously Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, is quoted as saying, the short-shield tactics in the Association of Chief Police Officer’s *Public Order Manual* (1983) were ‘a carbon-copy of the Hong Kong riot squad’\(^{38}\) who had brutally suppressed a leftist uprising in the colony in 1967. Their defining feature, rather obviously, were the small, light, round shields they carried with them. They were, and still are, also equipped with a ‘striking baton’\(^{39}\) in order to initiate offensive attacks. The manoeuvres short-shield units are expected to carry out, in essence, are an array of roving arrest actions (4-man, 2-man) or baton charges (with or without long-shield protection).\(^{40}\) The names of these manoeuvres suggest, rather definitively, a kind of paramilitary operation; ‘if a British short shield unit were dressed in khaki shorts instead of blue overalls, they would indeed be the Hong Kong riot squad as it appeared in the late sixties’.\(^{41}\)

The snatch squads are, as Northam\(^ {42}\) suggests, a ‘direct import from the British Colonial Police, perfected twenty years ago in Hong Kong’ and now ‘part of a sophisticated armoury of public order tactics which the Royal Hong Kong Police have taught officers in Britain since 1981’. Technically, they are a variation on the short-shield unit only with the express aim of entering into the crowd to perform an arrest, rather than to disperse those within it. As long-shield units are incapable of performing arrests due to the cumbersome nature of their equipment, it is down to snatch squads to carry them out.

Thus, the Sandford wargame was designed with dispersal in mind. The lineage of the various tactics put into practice during the Broadwater Farm riots can be traced back to the British colonial era. The paramilitarization of public order policing during the 1980s went hand-in-hand with the development of the wargame, as it codified particular types of responses made permissible in a public order situation. In other words, it sanctioned the use of these various tactics and allowed for particular manoeuvres to be performed, imposing them onto an imperfect landscape.

The STC was built for a new era in public order policing. Although dispersal tactics are practiced within this space, containment manoeuvres assume primacy. Peter Waddington suggests the tactic was developed in response to the Poll Tax Riot (1990), during which

\(^{38}\) Northam, Shooting in the Dark, p. 95.
\(^{39}\) Northam, Shooting in the Dark, p. 95.
\(^{40}\) Northam, Shooting in the Dark, pp. 188–91.
\(^{41}\) Northam, Shooting in the Dark, p. 95.
\(^{42}\) Northam, Shooting in the Dark, p. 23.
dispersal tactics used on the day were largely ‘counter-productive’, succeeding in ‘spreading the disorder that had occurred in Trafalgar Square throughout the West End’, rather than diminishing it. However it was only in 2001 that the manoeuvre morphed into a more recognizable form when deployed during a May Day demonstration, to contain 1,000 protesters at Oxford Circus.

Sørli identifies four different kinds of containments. The first of these is a ‘police kettle’ (polizeikessel) and refers to the most common, static containment. The second is the ‘wandering kettle’ (wanderkessel); a type of moving containment in which the police ‘arrange themselves in front of, to the sides of, and behind protesters as they march’. In such a manoeuvre the police have control over the territorial extent of the protesters encircled, resulting in the ability to exercise this spatial power as and when desired. The third type identified by Sørli does not have a direct German translation, but is referred to as a ‘hyper kettle’ and also rather ominously as a ‘compression machine’. In this the police ‘link arms, push forward firmly, compressing people against each other and any available building facades’, or as Joyce and Wain describe, such a manoeuvre involves the police ‘containing protesters in a cordon and gradually decreasing the space inside’.

Figure 6.4 Control. By James Rawlings (2014).

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48 Peter Joyce and Neil Wain, Palgrave Dictionary of Public Order Policing, Protest and Political Violence,
containment, the earliest of which, according to Sørli ‘occurred on the Pont de la Guillotière in Lyon, on 20 October 2010’.49

Whether in static, mobile, ‘hyper’ or ‘bridge’ forms, a containment is deployed to curtail the disruptive capacity of an assembled crowd by denying them territorial possibilities. Whilst the objective of ‘confin[ing] rioters to a defined area’ might have been listed in the original Public Order Manual (1984),50 with various manoeuvres such as the ‘wedge’ and the ‘cordon’ noted, the more specific art of creating a containment in order to minimize disruption is a recent phenomenon.

It is these latter tactics, I argue, that define the more recent period after incidents during the G20 (2009), student demonstrations (2010-2011), and austerity protests (2011-2013) attest to. Between the development of the Sandford wargame and the building of the STC, public order policing in the UK has undergone a territorial ‘switch’ from dispersal to containment. Whereas previously officers were trained to disperse protesters in the first instance, spaces such as that in Gravesend are designed to train officers in various containment/management situations in order to prohibit movement. This has had a considerable effect on the nature of protesting in the UK.

Anticipation and Territorial Determinism

The STC is a space through which particular modes of anticipation can be practiced by officers. Notably, it is a space that also de-limits these modes of anticipation, ‘affording’ only particular kinds of anticipation as wrought in the urban landscape. As a Guardian article explains in reference to it:

> Dressed in full riot gear, the officers in training were to separate a mob played by senior officers in civilian clothing in five intersecting streets, complete with facades. ‘It was quite intense,’ [James] Rawlings says. They would really antagonize them and get them riled, as a riot mob would. There was no holding back. They threw a range of projectiles, too – glass bottles, wooden bricks, molotov cocktails. There is no other way of preparing them other than making it as real as possible.51

Officers training at Gravesend cannot anticipate vertical threats. Neither could, to further elaborate, senior officers trained in the Sandford wargame. The difference between them, however, is that vertical threats did materialize during the Broadwater Farm riots. As a result, officers were ill-equipped to deal with them having been trained in ground-level scenarios as played out across, and between, a singular housing estate. During the austerity era few vertical threats presented themselves. Instead, this period was dominated by mobile threats,

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50 Northam, Shooting in the Dark, 183.

As is explained in relation to civil emergencies:

Anticipation is crucial in both the pre-emergency and post-emergency phases. Anticipation is commonly used to describe the first phase of the Integration Emergency Management (IEM) process, which sees organizations actively ‘\textit{horizon-scanning}’ for risks and potential emergencies. Anticipation is also a principle of effective response and recovery, and, at the strategic level, the risk focus must be forwards, upwards and outwards, with more operational risks being appropriately addressed at lower levels.\footnote{Cabinet Office, ‘Emergency Response and Recovery, p. 16.}

Further, in relation to a badger cull in Gloucestershire in 2013, police officers ran a table top wargame in order to ‘reveal…potential difficulties\footnote{Damian Carrington, ‘Badger Cull Activists Can ‘Bend the Rules’ During Protests, Say Police’, The Guardian, 13 June, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jun/13/badger-cull-activists-protests-police.} in how the police would manage the operation, keeping anti-cull activists apart from official marksmen. It was attempt, as the Bronze Commander of the operation suggested, to ‘avoid surprises during the cull’.\footnote{Carrington, ‘Badger Cull Activists Can ‘Bend the Rules’ During Protests‘.} In each of these quotes whether in relation to the STC, civil emergencies, or table top games; the aim of the exercises are to anticipate future events. Put otherwise, they are designed to ‘respond to a series of disruptive future events’.\footnote{Anderson, ‘Preemption, Precaution, Preparedness,’ p. 791.}

It is this ‘horizon-scanning’ that de-limits possible responses to public order situations, both at a strategic level (as in Sandford) and an operational level (as in Gravesend). If possible outcomes are not presented during these initial phases, then they cannot be accounted for. Further, that if these possible outcomes are not, as in Sandford or Gravesend, scripted into (a) any scenario or (b) encoded into the space then the act of planning for future events becomes difficult. This argument is similar to one articulated, later on, in chapter 8: maps in videogames serve as constrictive devices determining possible action.
As a result of this determinism, wargames are impossible without use of a cartographic device. As Crogan\(^\text{57}\) details, there are a number of ‘representational features’ to the wargame that center on or around the map itself. These include:

…individual pieces standing in for whole military units, the scale reduction of physical space to the dimensions of the game board or miniature terrain-analog, the formulas for calculating outcomes and losses, [and] the representation of uncertainty and unanticipated factors by means of dice throws…

Thus, like many games, there is the inclusion of various characters or teams (military units, responder organizations, police teams etc.), as well as mechanisms for unpredictable events to occur within such an activity. But both of these elements are nonetheless rendered useless unless in relation to a game space of some kind. Although this does not always have to be a map, in the case of the wargame this is a necessity bearing in mind the aim to simulate territorial warfare. But this is also the case with emulation spaces such as the STC. It functions as a ‘miniature terrain-analog’ much similar to the map – with various elements of the environment contributing to shaping idealized activities, manoeuvres and actions.

In Zones of Control, Dunnigan\(^\text{58}\) suggests operations research (OR)-based wargames post-WWII ‘created an artificial world where the possible outcomes fit the preconceived ideas of senior military and government leaders rather than known reality’. Further, as Klinke\(^\text{59}\) adds, that ‘Cold War strategic thinking mastered the art of condensing such war games into mathematical matrices’. Thus, whilst police exercises are designed to anticipate, prepare for, and preempt particular future, disruptive events, they also actively shape its coming-into-being. In other words, it is through the training exercise and training space, the simulation and emulation, that the future is acted upon. In so doing, however, it forecloses such a future by narrowing and ‘locking’ the specific type of responses deemed necessary to respond to the future. Unlike the ‘ludic geopolitics’ identified by Klinke,\(^\text{60}\) such activities are not designed in order to execute play’s disruptive possibilities, but to constrain them. The result is a kind of ‘territorial determinism’ in which the training exercise (Sandford) and the training space (STC) prefigure the manoeuvres to be performed during public order incidents such as protest events and riots, by writing them into the spaces themselves either on the map or in the architecture, street layout and building designation.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have sought to draw a conceptual genealogy between a police wargame and a training space. The former, colloquially referred to as ‘Sandford’ and the latter, the

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60 Klinke, ‘Self-Annilhilation, Nuclear Play and West Germany’s Compulsion to Repeat,’ p.2.
STC are designed to ensure police officers are trained in public order policing. Both employ play as a device through which possible future activities can be executed. However, there are marked differences in this execution. This is indicative of a shift in police tactics from the 1980s to the 2000s.

The Sandford wargame was developed to provide strategic training to senior police officers. The STC ensures junior officers are able to practice operational manoeuvres. Over the last 30 years there has been a ‘paramilitarization’ of public order policing in the UK and other liberal democracies (USA, France, Germany). Sandford was put into use during an early ‘shift’ in which colonial-era tactics were being re-introduced, codified and practiced in mainland police forces. The STC was built during a later ‘switch’ in tactics from dispersal to containment. The latter now assumes primacy in public order policing.

The rise of Civil Contingency planning has shaped the nature of public order policing, by codifying the nature of exercise types such as table top games and live demonstrations. Table top exercises, in the Civil Contingency literature, are designed to validate plans and probe weaknesses. Live exercises, on the other hand, are actual rehearsals of intended and idealized plans. They allow participants to become accustomed to performing the necessary activities post-emergency.

Whilst entertainment and activist wargames might claim to offer a ‘ludic subversion’ of ‘spectacular capitalism’, the Sandford exercise aimed to manage sub-sovereign contingencies through a ludic engagement with emergent, governable phenomena. This is exemplified in various ‘war’ games devised by police forces in the UK for a variety of public order scenarios across a range of terrains from racially-motivated riots in inner-city estates (Broadwater Farm 1985), to student demonstrations in urban locations (London 2010-2011). It is only through playing in, on or with the map – or over an emulated territory – do such scenarios have the possibility of being anticipated and the spaces in which they occur to be suitably governed. This has a similarity to in-game maps as discussed later on in chapters 7 and 8. Moreover, that in basing these simulations over particular terrains, a cartographic determinism then limits the applicability of the manoeuvres practiced.

Whilst their form may change – from table top to digital to real-world – their articulation towards future possible events remains broadly the same: each orients the multitude of manoeuvres practiced in each towards a cartographic device in order to address ‘the what-ifs’. In each the map becomes an ‘anticipation engine’ for generating and responding to particular kinds of actions deployable during public order incidents. Thus, a relation is formed between the variety of manoeuvres practiced and performed; and the map upon which these manoeuvres are performed over, on and across.

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The design of each exercise/space has had profound impact on the nature of manoeuvres performed ‘live’ during public order situations. As a result, the nature of anticipating future activities has become limited. This is what I have termed ‘territorial determinism’ – a determinism with marked effects on public order policing and protest. Yet, and most crucially, it is only through the playing of/in either that this deterministic relationship is realized. It is this dimension that marks play as intensely powerful, as explored in the introduction. Moreover, that there is a power imbued in the ‘what-if’-ness: who has the power to anticipate? Who has the power to play?

References


